到了20世纪60年代，政策制定者似乎与凯恩斯主义理论相契合。但回顾过去，大多数美国人都同意，政府在经济政策领域犯了一系列错误，最终导致财政政策的重新审查。1964年，为了刺激经济增长和减少失业，林登·约翰逊总统（1963-1969）和国会颁布了一项减税法案，并启动了一系列旨在减轻贫困的昂贵的国内支出计划。约翰逊还增加军费来支付美国参与越南战争的费用。这些庞大的政府项目，加上强劲的消费支出，推动了对商品和服务的需求超出了经济能够生产的范围。工资和物价开始上涨。很快，工资和物价的上涨在一个不断上升的循环中相互促进。这种物价的整体上涨被称为通货膨胀。凯恩斯认为，在这种需求过剩的时期，政府应该减少开支或提高税收以避免通货膨胀。但是反通货膨胀的财政政策在政治上很难被推销，政府拒绝转向它们。然后，在20世纪70年代初，国家受到国际石油和食品价格急剧上涨的冲击。这给政策制定者带来了一个严重的两难处境。传统的反通胀策略是通过削减联邦开支或提高税收来抑制需求。但这将耗尽已经承受油价上涨的经济体的收入。结果是失业率急剧上升。然而，如果决策者选择抵消油价上涨造成的收入损失，他们就不得不增加支出或减税。然而，由于这两项政策都不能增加石油或食品的供应，因此在不改变供应的情况下刺激需求只会意味着价格上涨。吉米·卡特总统（1976—1980）试图用双管齐下的策略来解决这一困境。他调整财政政策以应对失业，允许联邦赤字扩大，并为失业者建立反周期就业计划。为了对抗通货膨胀，他建立了自愿工资和物价控制计划。这一策略的两个要素都不奏效。到20世纪70年代末，这个国家遭受了高失业率和高通货膨胀率。虽然许多美国人把这种“滞胀”看作是凯恩斯主义经济学不起作用的证据，但另一个因素进一步削弱了政府运用财政政策管理经济的能力。赤字似乎是财政状况的永久性部分。在20世纪70年代停滞不前的时期，赤字问题引起了人们的关注。80年代，随着里根总统（1981-1989）推行减税和增加军事开支的计划，赤字问题进一步加剧。到1986年，赤字已经膨胀到2.21亿美元，占联邦总支出的22%以上。现在，即使政府想通过支出或税收政策来刺激需求，赤字也使得这样的战略变得不可思议。
加拿大蒙特利尔大学经济学论文代写：凯恩斯主义
By the 1960s, policymakers seemed to fit in with Keynesian theory. But in retrospect, most Americans agreed that the government made a series of mistakes in economic policy, which eventually led to a review of fiscal policy. In 1964, in order to stimulate economic growth and reduce unemployment, President Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969) and Congress enacted a tax cut bill and launched a series of expensive domestic expenditure plans to alleviate poverty. Johnson also increased military expenditure to pay for American involvement in the Vietnam War. These huge government projects, coupled with strong consumer spending, have pushed demand for goods and services beyond what the economy can produce. Wages and prices began to rise. Soon wages and prices rose in a rising cycle. This overall rise in prices is called inflation. Keynes argues that in times of excess demand, governments should cut spending or raise taxes to avoid inflation. But anti-inflation fiscal policies are politically difficult to sell, and the government refuses to turn to them. Then, in the early 1970s, the country was hit by the sharp rise in international oil and food prices. This poses a serious dilemma for policymakers. The traditional anti-inflation strategy is to curb demand by cutting federal spending or raising taxes. But that would deplete the revenues of economies already suffering from rising oil prices. As a result, unemployment has risen sharply. However, if policymakers choose to offset the loss of revenue from rising oil prices, they will have to increase spending or cut taxes. However, since neither policy can increase the supply of oil or food, stimulating demand without changing supply will only mean rising prices. President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) tried to solve this dilemma with a two-pronged strategy. He adjusted fiscal policy to deal with unemployment, allowed the federal deficit to expand, and set up counter-cyclical employment programs for the unemployed. To fight inflation, he set up a voluntary wage and price control program. Neither of the two elements of this strategy worked. By the end of the 1970s, the country suffered from high unemployment and inflation. Although many Americans see this “stagflation” as evidence that Keynesian economics does not work, another factor further weakens the ability of the government to use fiscal policy to manage the economy. The deficit seems to be a permanent part of the fiscal situation. During the period of stagnation in the 1970s, the deficit problem attracted people’s attention. In the 1980s, with President Reagan’s (1981-1989) plan to reduce taxes and increase military spending, the deficit problem worsened. By 1986, the deficit had ballooned to $221 million, accounting for more than 22% of total federal spending. Now, even if the government wants to stimulate demand through spending or tax policies, the deficit makes such a strategy incredible.